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THE LAW OF THE HIGH SEAS
IN TIME OF PEACE
Myres S. McDougal
It perhaps requires no emphasis to
this professional audience that the preceding lecture on "coastal state interests" (making reference to internal
waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the Continental Shelf)
and our topic for today, the "freedoms"
of the high seas in time of peace, are but
two sides of the same coin_ The exclusive interests of coastal states in the
enjoyment of proximate waters and the
inclusive interests of all states, even
including the landlocked, in the enjoyment of the oceans of the world are
entirely complementary: when exclusive
interests are expanded and inflated,
inclusive interests must be contracted
and deflated. The principal and continuing task of the whole law of the sea,
of the public order of the oceans, is thus

that of achieving in every particular
context, a balancing or accommodation
of these complementary interests which
will best promote the long-term common interests of all peoples, while rejecting any claims of special interest
destructive of such common interests_
You are all familiar with the tremendous technological changes in recent
decades that are permitting mUltiple
new uses, both constructive and destructive, of the vast potential reservoir of
values that we call the oceans. You are
also familiar with the increasing demands that different peoples about the
world are making upon the oceans for
the enjoyment of both old and new
uses. Unhappily, many of these demands are not being made in terms of a
common interest-designed to secure
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the utmost productive use of a great
sharable resource through practices of
reciprocity and mutual tolerance-but
rather in terms of special interest, for
unilateral monopolization of the resource and the destruction of shared
competence and enjoyment. It is but
one of the paradoxes of our time that
the most extravagant claims to monopolistic control over the oceans are being
put forward in the guise of preserving
"the common heritage of mankind."
Some 10 years ago Professor William
T. Burke and I wrote a book, The Public
Order of the Oceans: a Contemporary
International Law of the Sea. Among
other things, we sought to examine and
appraise the historic record of the in ternational law of the sea. The conclusion
to which we came, after a survey of the
record, was that this law, with a minimum of centralized organization and an
economic body of none-too·complex
rules, had served, and continues to
serve, mankind well in an inestimably
greater production and wider distribution of shared values than might have
been, or might be, achieved by monopolistic control.
Today it would appear that we may
be confronted, in a widespread disintegration of perceptions of common interest, with the imminent dissolution of
the principles and institutions which in
recent decades at least have served the
whole of mankind so well. With strong
preferences for the protection of common and rejection of special interests
and for a balancing in favor of inclusive
rather than exclusive interests, I confess
that I may appear before you today as a
pleader for forlorn, lost causes.
In developing this theme of contemporary disintegration, I propose to
proceed under the following four main
heads:
• The Specification of the Unique
Problems of the High Seas
• The Clarification of Bas;c General
Community Policies
• Trends in Past Decisions with Re-

spect to the Different Types of Problems
• Possible Alternatives with Respect
to Emerging and Future Problems

We begin with the specification of
problems.
To make certain that we communicate, I must be sure that we share the
same conceptions of international law
and of the law of the sea. By international law I mean the comprehensive
process of authoritative decision, transcending all territorial boundaries, by
which the peoples of the world clarify
and implement their common interests.
When we look at any community, that
is, any group of people exhibiting interdeterminations and interdependences,
we can observe a process of effective
power in the sense that decisions are
taken and enforced whether particular
people like it or not. Such a process is
observable on a global scale. Even the
Russians, the Communist Chinese, and
ourselves are scorpions in the same
bottle who must take each other's decisions into account.
When we look closely at effective
power decisions, we can see that they
are of two different kinds. Some are
taken by naked power, by sheer calculations of expediency in self-interest; but
others are taken in accordance with
general community expectations. These
latter decisions are taken by the people
who are expected to take them and in
arenas of constituted authority, such as
courts, legislatures, and executive departments. They are taken in accordance with community expectations
about how they should be made-about
appropriate policies and criteria. They
are taken by established procedures and
enforced in sufficient degree to be of
community consequence; they have adequate sanctions in common interest,
reciprocity, and retaliation.
It is this latter flow of decisions,
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those taken and enforced in accordance
with general community expectations,
which-when projected on a transnational scale-we mean by international law. International law is much
more than, as sometimes described in
the books, a body of abstract rules. The
rules merely describe, and often most
inadequately, past decisions. International law is a living, contemporaneous
process of choice, which includes both
the perspectives of community members
about such choices and the operations
or authoritative practices by which such
choices are put into controlling effect.
When we look more carefully at the
flow of authoritative decision in the
global community, as in any community, we can see that it is composed
of two different kinds of decisions. The
first are the decisions which establish
and maintain the most comprehensive
process of authoritative and controlling
decision. We may call these the "constitutional" or, preferably, the constitutive
decisions. These are the decisions which
determine who the authorized decisionmakers are; what policies they are to
follow; in what structures of authority
they are to act; what their bases of
power for sanctioning purposes are to
be; and what procedures they are to
follow in making all the different kinds
of decisions necessary to clarifying and
implemen ting general community
policy. In the global community, as in
most communities (even those with
written constitutional documents), this
constitutive process is largely a product
of the expectations people create in
each other by their continuous cooperative behavior.
The second kind of decisions, embraced within any comprehensive
process of authoritative decision, are
those that emerge from constitutive
process for the regulation of all the
community's various value processes.
These are the decisions by which resources are allocated, planned, developed, and exploited; by which an

environment is protected or devastated;
by which populations are protected,
regulated, and controlled; by which an
economy is maintained or destroyed; by
which health is fostered or neglected; by
which human rights are protected or
deprived; by which enlightenment is
encouraged or retarded; and so on. One
might describe this second kind, or
category, of decisions in many different
ways. For convenience we refer to them
as "public order" decisions.
What we mean by "the law of the
sea" may now be made clear. The law of
the sea comprises the "public order"
decisions which a global constitutive
process, established and maintained by
all states, even including the landlocked,
prescribes and applies for clarifying and
securing the common in terests of all
peoples in the enjoyment of the oceans.
In comparable terms, we might speak of
the law of outer space, the law of
international rivers, the law of the polar
regions, and -so on.
Before moving to the details of the
law of the sea, I should like to refer
briefly to certain features of the larger
global constitutive process of especial
relevance. Most importantly, in recent
decades we can observe a tremendous
democratization. In addition to nationstates, international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure
groups, private associations, and even
individual human beings have begun to
play significant roles. With this increase
in the range of effective participants has
come a large proliferation in the number
of territorial and functional entities
demanding and being given voice. On
problems other than with respect to the
oceans, one might discern an increasing
emphasis upon the necessity for protecting common interests, with rejection
of all claims of special interest. Witness
the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, article 2(4) for th.e minimization of coercion, the elaborate clarification of individual human rights in many
declarations and covenants, and the
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projected policies for the shared enjoyment of international rivers, the polar
regions, and outer space and for the
protection of the environment more
generally. One might observe also an
enormous increase in organized, inclusive structures of authority-as in the
United Nations and the specialized and
regional agencies-with some trend
toward openness in access and making
appearance compulsory for participants
whose choices in fact affect community
policy. There would appear also a
modest trend toward allocating to representatives of the inclusive community
both the authority and other assets
required for the better securing of demanded public order. The authority and
control of t.lJ.e United Nations and the
specialized agencies are being increasingly enhanced by the demands, identifications, and expectations of the
peoples of the world.
One critical feature of the larger
constitutive process relates to how international law, including the law of the
sea, is made. Historically, international
law has been made largely in two
different ways. One way is by an explicit agreement process in which varying numbers of states get together and
project a common policy in relatively
deliberate, explicit form. The other, and
by far the most important, way has
been by unarticulated, habitual cooperative behavior in different kinds of activities from which expectations about
authority and control are derived. In
this latter modality of lawmaking, it is
not, as some recent clamant voices have
asserted, the unilateral claim by one
state that makes law, but rather the
parallel claims by many states made in a
context of expectations of reciprocity
and mutual tolerance. Fortunately, the
practices of the United Nations have
given a great assist to both these traditional modes of lawmaking and are
beginning to add an institutional dimension more closely approximating genuine parliamentary enactment.

With this background in constitutive
process, we are now in a position to
return to our initial task of delimiting
the unique features and problems of the
law of the sea which is prescribed and
applied by such process. What makes
the law of the sea unique is the difference in the degree to which the oceans
and landmasses of the world admit of
shared, noncompetitive enjoyment in
the production and distribution of
values.
The oceans admit of shared enjoyment in high degree. Many of the
resources of the oceans are vast, nonconsumable, nonexhaustible, or renewable; by appropriate rules of the
road, their enjoyment can be made
noncompetitive, while remaining economic. Where one ship has just been,
another can soon come. When the initiative, energies, capital, and skills of all
peoples can be brought to bear upon the
enjoyment of such a resource, the production and distribution of values can,
in a "multiplier" effect, be enormously
enhanced for the benefit of all.
The landmasses of the earth do not
admit of shared enjoyment in the same
degree. Their relative solidity facilitates
the establishment of permanent sedentary communities with exclusive claims,
and their natural barriers such as mountains, streams, bodies of waters, and
deserts inhibit freedom of movement.
Hence, the global constitutive process
has honored the exclusive appropriation, through the organization of territorial communities, of most landmasses.
Even so, one observable function of
what is called private international law
is an effort to make the landmasses as
sharable as possible by building and
maintaining a world economy.
The different territorial communities
do, of course, require some protection
from, and enjoyment of, the immediately proximate oceans for the safe,
healthy, and secure functioning of their
internal value processes. It is for this
reason that the global constitutive
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process honors their claims in relation
to internal waters, the territorial sea,
contiguous zones, and occasional exercises of a unilateral competence in
self-defense even upon the high seas.
Such claims are rooted in different
exclusive interests in the sense that no
two states have precisely the same coastlines or precisely the same requirements
in internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zones, or self-defense. They are,
however, common interests in the sense
that every coastal state has an interest in
the effective protection of the activities
on its landmasses from activities on the
oceans. The claims become expressive of
special interest, and hence requiring
rejection, only when they are asserted
beyond need and irrespective of their
impact upon others.
It is the complementary inclusive
interests of all peoples in the shared
enjoyment of the oceans, interests that
are commonly subsumed under the label
"freedom of the seas" for summary
contrast with the exclusive coastal state
interests, that are our especial concern
in this discussion today. For systematic
examination and appraisal of the
clamant contemporary assertions thatbecause of changed conditions in the
exploitation of the oceans and because
of the more general desperate economic
needs of the developing countries-the
"freedom of the seas" has become
outmoded and that it has become necessary greatly to curtail the protection
that world constitutive process affords
inclusive interests, I propose to organize
our discussion in terms of the more
important types of claims that states
have traditionally made against each
other for the protection of their inclusive interests. These claims may be
briefly itemized as follows:
• Claims relating to delimitation of
the boundaries between inclusive and
exclusive interests.
• Claims relating to freedom of access to the oceans for use.

• Claims relating to the exclusive
appropriation of resources.
• Claims relating to jurisdiction (the
making and application of law) with
respect to activities upon the oceans.
• Claims relating to the maintenance
of minimum order (prevention of unauthorized violence) upon the oceans.
• Claims relating to the promotion
of optimum order (maximum production of values) in the enjoymen t of
the oceans.
Each of these claims is distinguishable in
that certain unique policies apply to it;
yet all are interrelated in that the
decisions about them, taken as a whole,
determine the aggregate public order of
the oceans and, hence, require the most
explicit and careful relation to basic
general community policies.
II

We turn now to the clarification,
from the standpoint of an observer who
seeks to identify with the whole larger
community of mankind, of basic, general community policies.
It is necessary to begin with highest
level abstractions, since how we perceive
the whole vitally affects how we perceive the part. The first proposition I
would advance is that it is the prime
responsibility of global constitutive
process in relation to the public order of
the oceans, as in relation to any other
aspect of transnational public order, to
clarify and protect the common interests of all peoples and to reject all
claims of special interests. By common
interests I refer to shared demands for
values whose achievement is affected by
conditions of interdependence or interdetermination. By special interests I
refer to those which are destructive of
common interests, in the sense that the
demand for values cannot be shared
even in equivalencies and that their
achievement is violative of the conditions of interdependence, imposing
unnecessary harm upon others.
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The common interests of all peoples
in the enjoyment of the oceans are, as
already emphasized, of two different
kinds: inclusive and exclusive. By inclusive I refer to in terests in activities
that have significant transnational effects, that is, which importantly affect
more than one territorial community.
By exclusive I refer to interests in
activities which predominantly affect
only one territorial community.
The inclusive interests of peoples in
the enjoyment of the oceans may be
described as relating to both minimum
order and optimum order. By minimum
order I refer to the conduct of activities
by the processes of persuasion and
agreement, with a minimum of unauthorized violence and other coercion.
By optimum order I refer to cooperative
activity in the greater production and
wider distribution of all values, in the
maintenance of a world economy and
society.
The exclusive interests of peoples
may be described, similarly, in terms of
both minimum and optimum order.
Every coastal state has an interest in
protecting its own internal minimum
order, its relatively unique processes of
cooperative activity, from unauthorized
coercion, whether such coercion comes
from internal or external sources. Every
state has also an interest in its own
internal optimum order, in the healthy
functioning of its relatively unique
processes for the shaping and sharing of
all values.
In very recent times it has been
strongly urged that the developing countries should be accorded a special width
of territorial sea and other concessions,
beyond what has traditionally been regarded as in common interest, because
of their special economic needs and as a
way of righting the wrongs of a historic
maldistribution of income. It is explicitly recognized that these claims
cannot be made with a promise of
reciprocity to others and that they
cannot be honored except by severe

restriction of the previously protected
inclusive rights of all. It may be sug·
gested that these claims on behalf of the
developing states are most misguided in
relation to common interest. The developing states could win by such extensions of their protected interests
only if other states acquiesced and did
not make comparable demands for extension. If a large number of other
states make comparable demands, the
sharable resource that lays the golden
egg in mUltiplying the production of
values can no longer be shared and
everybody, including the developing
states, will lose. The history of the law
of the sea in recent decades, when not
distorted for partisan purposes, demonstrates that the oceans can be maintained as a sharable resource open to all
with the necessary initiative, skill, and
capital, with tremendous benefits for all
in the production and distribution of
values. The claims on behalf of the
developing states are claims of special
interests both in that their demands for
values cannot be shared even in equivalences and that the conditions of their
achievement must violate interdependences with others. The historic inequities in the distribution of income might
be better remedied by appropriate reorganization upon the landmasses than
by destroying the multiplier potential of
the oceans.
The implications of these broad
policies for decision about specific problems will be made apparent below.

III
Let us turn next to the description of
past trends in decision with respect to
the different kinds of problems.
We begin with the problem of establishing boundaries between inclusive and
exclusive interests. For many decades,
until very recent times at least, our
global constitutive process indulged a
strong presumption in favor of inclusive
interests, limiting the area of exclusive
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coastal interests as much as possible and
permitting their expansion only as particular urgent purposes might require.
Thus, the baseline which marked the
outer boundary of "internal waters,"
from which the territorial sea was
measured, was required to follow the
sinuosities of the coast, with only
modest exception for bays. It was not
until the Norwegian Fisheries case, 1
which rightly or wrongly found certain
special needs in Norway for fish, that
this requirement began to be relaxed.
Similarly, prior to the 1960 Geneva
Conference, it was generally agreed that
the width of the territorial sea had to be
very narrow, with most states claiming
only 3 miles. Even at the Geneva Conference it was agreed that states had no
unilateral competence to extend their
territorial sea at the expense of the
public domain, and 12 miles was regarded as the utmost limit that anybody
thought lawful. All this consensus was
in wise recognition that the territorial
sea has largely ceased to serve any
common interest in the protection of
exclusive coastal interests. The two principal justifications of a territorial sea
have been traditionally formulated in
terms of security and the need for fish.
Yet the width of the territorial sea has
today practically no relation to military
security: attacks can come from anywhere on the oceans or from the other
side of the moon. When special security
needs arise, they can be taken care of by
contiguous zones or equivalent concepts. The width of the territorial sea
has, again, almost equally little relation
to the exploitation of fisheries. Most
fish simply do not move, breed, and live
within narrow bands of water off the
coasts. It would require an enormous
expropriation of the "common heritage" for any single state to obtain
control over important stocks of fish. It
is for these reasons that I continue to
tell my classes that the most rational
width of the territorial sea would end at
the low-water mark.

The extension of unilateral competence through the device of "contiguous zones" has also been strictly
limited to distances regarded as "reasonable" for the particular purposes for
which such zones are claimed. States
making special claims for the protection
of their security, customs and fiscal
regulations, immigration laws, health,
and so on have been required to tailor
the zones claimed quite precisely to fit
the special ne~ds asserted, with the least
possible infringement of inclusive interests. The Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
goes so far, quite irrationally and impractically I think, as to limit all such
claims to "twelve miles from the base
line from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured." Whether
irrational and impractical or not, this
asserted limit does demonstrate that its
framers had not the slightest dream of
the lawfulness of the contemporary
extravagant claims about the width of
the territorial sea.
The recent expansion of exclusive
coastal state interests through the concept of the "Continental Shelf" has, as
in the case of contiguous zones, been
limited more by purpose than by distance. It may be recalled that the
Convention on the Continental Shelf,
despite its reference to a depth of 200
meters, in express terms limits the width
of the shelf only by requirements of
"adjacency" and "exploitability,"
which are somewhat open ended. The
limits in terms of purpose are, however,
clear and important. The monopoly of
the coastal state is extended only to
certain exhaustible stock resources, that
is, "the mineral and other non-living
re!:~.;Lrces of the seabed and subsoil,"
and to certain relatively immobile organisms. The policies for distinguishing
these resources relate, quite rationally in
common interest, to the economy and
technology of exploitation, to dangers
of pollution, and to potential threats to
security from fixed, relatively per-
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manent installations. It is expressly provided in the convention that this limited
monopoly in the coastal state is not to
affect the legal status of the superjacent
waters or airspace and is not to be
exercised in ways interfering with traditional inclusive interests.
The contemporary disintegration in
perceptions of common interest, referred to above, is reflected both in
widespread assertions of a unilateral
competence to extend all these areas of
exclusive interest and in occasional suggestions that there are no good reasons
for maintaining the nice historic discriminations in the purposes for which
the different areas are protected, that is,
that global constitutive process should
honor a single broad area of exclusive
coastal in terest.
Turning to problems of access to
areas agreed to be within the inclusive
domain, we can observe that in recent
decades global constitutive process has
sought the utmost freedom of access for
all peoples for the greatest variety of
purposes. Thus, the Geneva Convention
on the High Seas 110t only explicitly
stipulates for protection such traditional
freedoms as those of navigation, fishing,
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and flying over the high seas, but
also adds an inter alia, which provides
protection for the great host of
emerging new uses. The potentialities of
these emerging new uses-in the production and distribution of values for the
benefit of all peoples-must stagger even
an informed imagination: contemporary
anticipations make reference to imminent developments in exploitation of
the mineral and other resources of the
deep seabed, improved fisheries, underwater transportation, scientific inquiry,
weather forecasting and climate control,
ecological conservation, power development, sea farming, storage and disposal,
undersea residence, floating cities, recreation and therapy, and so on.
Fortunately, the contemporary uninformed attacks upon the "freedom of

the seas" do not directly question the
importance either of equal access or of
the protection of open-ended purposes
in the enjoyment of the "high seas."
What these attacks fail to perceive is
that the more comprehensive the area in
which such freedom of access and multiplication of activities are protected (that
is, the greater the area included within
the "high seas"), the greater the multiplier effect from shared enjoyment in
the production and distribution of
values.
The particular resources of the
oceans, which may be held open for
inclusive enjoyment or subjected to
exclusive appropriation, are of very different kinds in terms of their characteristics bearing upon the potentialities
of shared use. There are "space·extension" resources whose distinctive
characteristic is their utility as media of
movement, transportation, and communication. There are "flow" or renewable resources, of which different
quantities become available at different
times and which mayor may not be
increased or diminished by human
action. Finally, there are "stock" resources, of which the quantity is relatively fixed and which may be abundant
or scarce. 2
It has been a principal function of
the doctrine of the "freedom of the
seas" to maintain space-extension resources, within the area of the inclusive
domain, open for shared enjoyment by
all. Since any particular use of a spaceextension resource need not interfere
with other uses or reduce productivity,
the larger the number of participants
who engage in use, the greater is the
production and distribution of values.
Hence, global constitutive process has
long enforced a strong presumption in
favor of inclusive enjoyment of navigation, flying, cable-laying, pipe·laying,
scientific inquiry, and so on.
The principal flow or renewable resources are, of course, fish. Different
kinds of fish apparently differ in

183
measure in the degree to which their
renewability is affected by the activities
of man and have a critical point in their
exploitation. Most kinds of fish would
appear, however, to inhabit the oceans
in such abundance as to require only
modest, if any, measures in conservation
for shared enjoyment. Hence, global
constitutive process has, again, decreed
a strong presumption in favor of such
enjoyment. Particular states have been
accorded exclusive preferential rights
only in cases of exceptional need, and
restrictive measures for purposes of conservation have, escept for a few species,
been of minimai impact. One conse·
quence of this shared enjoyment has
been an accelerating increase in the
production of food from the oceans,
though many areas of the oceans still
remain largely unexplored.
The established processes of decision
have, as yet, had but little experience
with allocation of the "stock" resources
(petroleum and other minerals) of the
oceans. The reservation of such reo
sources beneath Continental Shelves to
the coastal states has already been mentioned. The disposition of such resources beneath the surface of the deep
seabed is presently a matter of urgent
discussion in the global arena, and certain alternatives will be examined below.
The most insistent contemporary
misconceptions of common interest are
comprised of increasing demands for
preferential rights for coastal states with
respect to fish. If agreement for an
organized, inclusive enjoyment fails,
comparable demands may shortly be
made with respect to the stock resources of the deep seabed.
It should not be surprising, in a
relatively decentralized and unorganized
world, that peoples should find the best
guarantee of inclusive enjoyment in
inclusive competence. For the making
and application of law with respect to
activities upon the oceans, global constitutive process delegates a highly

shared competence to particular states.
For decades a few relatively simple rules
and a minimum of organization have
been employed both to maintain order
and to promote optimum enjoyment.
The few rules are built upon the
basic constitutive prescnpnon that
everybody is entitled to free access to
the oceans and that nobody is authorized to exclude anyone else from
shared enjoyment. The first rule is that
every state may make and apply law to
the activities of its own ships and
nationals. The second rule is that no
state may make and apply law to the
ships of other states except for violations of intemationallaw-violations relating to piracy, slave trading, infringements of contiguous zones, threats to
security, and so on. The third rule, and
the linchpin which has held the whole
simple structure of shared competence
and enjoyment together, is that every
state may ascribe its nationality to a
ship and that no state may, for whatever
reason, question this ascription of nationality.
The principal attack upon this structure of shared competence has come in
the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas (article 5) which provides for a
"genuine link" between a state conferring nationality and a ship. This
concept was derived from the Nottebohm case, 3 which fashioned it to
deprive an individual human being of
access to a tribunal for a hearing on the
merits of alleged mistreatment, and no
one has ever suggested any rational
meaning that might be given to it in
relation to ships. At first it was feared
that the concept might be employed to
permit states unilaterally to question
each other's competence to confer nationality on ships. So far these fears
have proved unfounded, and it is to be
hoped that they will remain groundless.
This is not to suggest that there are not
problems about labor relations, taxation, safety, and health requirements in
relation to ships that require attention.
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It is rather to suggest that each of these
problems has its own unique remedies
and cannot be resolved by destroying
the linchpin that holds the entire structure of shared competence together.
The prevalence of shared military
uses makes the maintenance of minimum order, that is, the prevention of
unauthorized violence, even more complex upon the oceans than upon the
landmasses. The basic policies of the
United Nations Charter and associated
prescriptions apply equally to the
oceans as to the landmasses, and the
basic distinction between impermissible
coercion ("aggression," "threats to the
peace," "intervention," et cetera) and
permissible coercion ("self-defense,"
"police action," "reprisals," "sanctions," et cetera) is equally relevant.
The application of these policies reo
mains, however, largely decentralized,
and the special circumstances of interaction upon the oceans make assessments of lawfulness and unlawfulness
peculiarly difficult. Every state is held
responsible for the lawful behavior of
the ships to which it ascribes nationality, and when ships are responsible
to no state, the historic, but still important, law of piracy becomes applicable.
In very recent days there has been
some insistence with respect to the
oceans, as with respect to outer space,
that "peaceful uses" do not include any
military uses. The perception that the
present precarious "peace" of the world
is dependent not so much upon the
prescriptions of the United Nations as
upon a very delicate global balancing of
power, in which the military uses of the
oceans play an important role, has,
however, precluded this insistence from
being made effective. Some modest
steps toward a balanced demilitarization
of the oceans have been achieved in the
prohibition of nuclear tests and an
emerging prohibition of fixed nuclear
installa tions.
For the promotion of optimum
order, that is the maximum production

and distribution of values, the law of
the sea maintains a great variety of
prescriptions and institutions. For reo
solving conflicts between different inclusive uses, between inclusive and exclusive uses, and between different ex·
clusive uses, the overriding aspiration is
to achieve an economic accommodation
through a systematic, contextual analysis of relative impacts and of the policy
consequences of alternatives in decision.
This general approach is reflected in
comprehensive and detailed prescriptions about a host of problems, such as
the allocation of jurisdiction, imposition
of liability for injury, rules of the road,
conformity with international stan·
dards, safety of life at sea, signal codes,
assistance to persons and ships in distress, nuclear-powered ships, pollution,
and so on. The role of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization in the modernization and adminis·
tration of these prescriptions is well
known.

IV
We come, finally, to the new,
emerging problems and possible alterna·
tives for their solution.
A call is being made by the General
Assembly for a new United Nations
conference on the law of the sea in
1973. At this conference the whole
allocation of interests and competences
between the inclusive community and
coastal states will undoubtedly be
brought up for review, and, given the
arrogant contemporary perspectives of
nationalism and misperceptions of common interest, disaster may impend.
The problems that, thanks to an
assist from Ambassador Pardo of f.Ialta,
have precipitated this comprehensive
review of the law of the sea are those
that derive from the newly achieved
accessibility of the deep seabed and its
resources. From an anthropological per·
spective, these particular problems
might appear to admit of solution either
by an extension of the exclusive com-
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petence of states or by retention of
inclusive competence, with a choice
among a number of specific alternatives
under each general option.
One alternative in exclusive competence might be to permit coastal states,
under the "exploitability" criterion in
the Continental Shelf Convention, to
extend their authority and control over
seabed resources up to a point in the
middle of the ocean, where they might
confront each other. This approach
would require an interpretation of the
Continental Shelf Convention not now
generally accepted and would, of
course, give the bulk of the riches of the
deep seabed to only a few states.
Another alternative in exclusive competence might be to regard the surface
of the seabed and its underlying riches,
as the landmasses were once regarded, as
res nullius and to honor permanent,
exclusive appropriation of areas effectively occupied. This would, of course,
reward the strong and technologically
advanced states at the expense of others
and might lead to intense conflicts as
states sought to establish new domains
of sovereign ty.
Alternatives in inclusive competence
would appear to admit of an infinite
variety in degrees of organization. The
least organized form would be to treat
the riches of the seabed as res com·
munis, like fish, and to allow participants in the enjoyment of the oceans to
stake out claims for limited competence
over identifiable and finite submarine
areas for the purpose of exploitation.
The adoption of this alternative would
require states to prescribe and apply
mi"ning laws, such as have prevailed
upon the landmasses: claimants would
be required to give public notice of the
areas claimed, to identify and mark the
area of operation as clearly as possible,
and to commence and complete exploitation of the designated area within
a reasonable time. Such a system could
be administered without a vast interna·
tional bureaucracy, and, if agreement

upon more organized inclusive competence fails, it could be this alternative
with which the peoples of the world will
actually operate.
More organized inclusive competence
could range from the mere provision of
recording or registration facilities and
dispute settlement to a monopoly of
production and distribution activities by
international agencies. There are literally dozens of potential models both in
variety of purpose and machinery of
administration. Within very recent years
the United States, through the initiative
of President Nixon, has put forward for
consideration by the United Nations
one such model which would appear
both magnanimous in purpose and
highly complex in its prescription and
projected administration. This proposal
would mark the outer limit of comprehensive, exclusive coastal competence
over the resources of the seabed at the
point where the waters reach 200
meters in depth, establish a shared
competence between coastal states and
the general community over the resources of the continental margin beyond the 200·meter point, and provide
an international machinery for control
of exploration and exploitation beyond
the continental margin. From all exploitation beyond the 200·meter point,
royalties would be collected for the
benefit of the developing countries. It
can be expected that many comparable
models will burgeon from many other
sources, official and nonofficial.
Any rational choice among the options in unorganized and organized exploitation of the resources of the deep
seabed must, of course, depend upon
the kind and quality of the organization
that states can negotiate. The high
potentials in, and the necessity for, the
most intense cooperation, if all possible
multiple uses are to be enjoyed and
protected, would appear, however, to
establish a strong presumption in favor
of a· high degree of organized, inclusive
competence.
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A rational decision about establishing
the boundaries between exclusive
coastal competence and inclusive general community competence over the
resources of the seabed must equally
depend upon the purposes and administrative machinery that states can negotiate_ Given the legislative history of the
Continental Shelf Convention and subsequent practice and authoritative communication, including the North Sea
case,4 there would appear little doubt
that coastal states may, within the limits
of "adjacency" and under the benefits
of "exploitability," extend their exclusive competence to the full width of
the geologic margin. If, however, states
can negotiate purposes and administrative machinery, adequate to ensure the
security and other shared exclusive interests of coastal states, to provide for
both representative and responsible participation on an inclusive basis, and to
afford reasonable promise of an enhanced and economic production of
values with an equitable distribution,
then common interest might suggest
drawing the outer limits of exclusive
competence somewhat closer to the
shore.
One final emphasis might be that the
problem of remedying a global maldistribution of income should not be
permitted to blind peoples to the inherent exigencies of a productive use of
the oceans. When large portions of a
poten tially sharable resource are
brought under exclusive, monopolistic
competence and control, there can only
be a diminishing of production. No
matter how equitable the formula for
distribution, when the total "pie" available to be divided is small, a share may
not be worth very much. The special
problems involved in allocating a percentage of the oceans' wealth for the
benefit of the developing states or for
the support of the United Nations can
and should be considered on their
merits, without their being intermingled
with considerations about the most pro-

ductive and economic employment of
resources.
In conclusion, I should like to strike
hard the same note with which I began.
Law in any community serves the function of clarifying and protecting the
common interests of the members of
that community. The quality of law
that a community can achieve depends
most fundamentally upon the perspectives of its members about their common interests: What values they demand, how deeply they identify with
the whole community, and the comprehensiveness and realism of their expectations about the conditions under which
they can secure their values. For one
who seeks to identify with the whole
community of mankind and is concerned with the global common interest,
the most urgent task is that of clarifying
for the peoples of the world the continuing tremendous advantages in maintaining the utmost inclusive competence
over, and enjoyment of, the oceans. In
peroration about the beauties of a narrow territorial sea, Professor Burke and
I made an argument which applies, I
think, equally to all the resources of the
oceans. We put it this way:
The positive form of the argument for maintaining the oceans
of the world open in the greatest
degree possible for inclusive use
can be related in detail to every
phase of the process of interaction
by which the oceans are in fact
used and enjoyed. Most importantly, the physical characteristics
of the resources sought to be
enjoyed-of the oceans as a spatial-extention resource, principally
useful as a domain for movement,
and of the fisheries as, for the
most part, a flow or renewable
resource, without a critical zone
below which depletion is technologically irreversible-establish
that such resources are sharable in
highest degree, promising maximum gains to all, with a minimum
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of particular losses, from inclusive
use. The world social process exhibits many territorial communities, private associations, and individuals with the capabilities, and
potential capabilities, of assisting
in the exploitation of the riches of
the oceans. The ocean areas are so
vast that simultaneous activities
may go forward, at the cost of
only minor physical accommodations, even in the waters closest to
coasts. Inclusive access to the
oceans both significantly enhances
the base values of all participants
in their enjoyment and increases
the aggregate base values brought
to bear by the general community

upon exploitation. The strategies
by which resources so vast are
exploited can be noncompetitive
and cooperative, with a minimum
of mutual interference and deprivation. The outcomes of inclusive,
cooperative enjoyment-as several
centuries have demonstrated-can
be genuinely integrative, with all
winning and none losing, in a
tremendous production and wide
sharing of benefits.
It is at least incumbent upon
those who dispute this position
either to give reasons based upon
common interest or explicitly to
reject common interest as a basis
for decision. 5

FOOTNOTES
1. The Hague, International Court of Justice, "Fisheries Case, Judgment of December 18,
1951," ICJ Reports (Hague: 1951), p. 116. The Court, recognizing the unusual configuration of
Norway's coast, upheld over United Kingdom challenge a Norwegian territorial sea delimitation
that used straight baselines protruding from the outermost points of its land not continuously
covered by the sea.
2. The concepts of "flow" and "stock" resources are borrowed from Siegfried von
Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resources Conservation-Economics and Policies (1952). For further explication of all these types of resources, see Myres S. McDougal, et al., Law and Public Order in Space
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 776, et seq.
3. The Hague, International Court of Justice, "Nottebohm Case (second phase) Judgment of
April 6, 1955," ICJ Reports (Hague: 1955), p. 4. Nottebohm, a German citizen resident in
Guatemala 34 years, became a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein in October 1939. Rejecting his
claim that Guatemala ignored this Liechtenstein citizenship in illegally deporting him later in the
war, the Court held his association with Liechtenstein was too tenuous to justify other states'
recognition of that citizenship, which was obtained merely for his protection.
4. The Hague, International Court of Justice, "North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment," ICJ
Reports (Hague: 1969). p. 3. The Court found that boundary lines for division of the North Sea
Continental Shelf were to be drawn eqUitably among Germany, Denmark. and Holland. The
Court rejected an argument that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
controlled the division and also held that the principle of equidistant delimitation was not a rule
of customary international law.
5. Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962). p. 564.
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